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Abstract
This paper presents the results of a three-year evaluation performed on the first 
cohorts of Chile Solidario, the most important anti-poverty program in Chile. 
The paper presents a description of the program, emphasizing the mechanism 
by which people were admitted into the program. We then propose evaluation 
strategies and discuss their validity. The final evaluation is conducted using a 
Matching estimator, and we discuss the principles surrounding the potential for 
this to be a valid evaluation method. The initial results using the Chile Solidario 
Panel suggest that the program had positive effects on psychosocial welfare 
and on take-up of subsidies and social programs. However, it is not possible to 
obtain reliable results due to data shortcomings, particularly the lack of baseline 
data. In order to solve the problem, we generated a database using six years 
of administrative data, including around 1,000,000 family records per year. 
A method for overcoming the treatment substitution problem is discussed and 
implemented. Results are much more robust than those of the Chile Solidario 
Panel and show small, but clearly positive effects for several variables, especially 
the number of workers in the family, the percentage of workers in the family and 
the employment of the head of the family.
Key words: Matching, Extreme poverty, Impact evaluation, Treatment substi-
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Resumen
Este artículo presenta los resultados de una evaluación de tres años realizada en 
las primeras cohortes del Programa Chile Solidario, el programa de reducción 
de la pobreza más importante de Chile. El artículo presenta una descripción del 
programa, haciendo hincapié en el mecanismo por el cual las personas fueron 
admitidas en el programa. A continuación, propone estrategias de evaluación 
y discute su validez. La evaluación final se realiza mediante un estimador de 
“Matching” (pareo), y se discuten los principios en base a los cuales se trataría 
de un método de evaluación válida. Los resultados iniciales usando el Panel 
de Chile Solidario sugieren que el programa ha tenido efectos positivos sobre 
el bienestar psicosocial y en la adopción de subsidios y programas sociales. 
Sin embargo, no es posible obtener resultados fiables debido a las deficiencias 
de datos, en particular la falta de una línea de base. Con el fin de resolver el 
problema, hemos generado una base de datos utilizando seis años de datos 
administrativos, incluyendo alrededor de 1.000.000 de registros de familias 
por año. Un método para superar el problema de sustitución de tratamiento es 
discutido y aplicado. Los resultados son mucho más robustos que los del Panel 
de Chile Solidario y muestran pequeños, pero evidentes efectos positivos de 
varias variables, especialmente relativos al número de trabajadores en el hogar, 
el porcentaje de trabajadores en el hogar y el empleo del jefe de hogar.
Key words: Pareo, Pobreza extrema, Evaluación de impacto, Sustitución de 
tratamiento, Datos administrativos.
JEL Classification: C14, I30, I38.
1.  Introduction
Chile Solidario is the most important anti-poverty program in Chile. It is a 
joint coordination effort between all public sectors, so as to strongly focus social 
benefits on families living in extreme poverty conditions1. It consists of three 
main components: psychosocial support, in the form of a subprogram called 
Puente (Bridge); preferential access to the social services and programs offered 
by the State; and guaranteed access to the subsidies offered by the State, includ-
ing a small amount of money provided exclusively to program beneficiaries. In 
the last year covered by this evaluation (2006) there were more than 250,000 
participating families.
1  The executives of Chile Solidario refer to it as a Social Protection System, which coordi-
nates different programs. Within the Impact Evaluation literature it can be considered a 
program, only that its benefits are selected from a menu instead of being identical to all 
of those in the treatment group.Evaluating the Chile… / F. Hoces de la Guardia, A. Hojman, O. Larrañaga 131
The impact evaluation was designed over a period beginning one year after 
the program’s implementation. The instrument designed for this purpose was 
the Chile Solidario Panel Survey (PCHS). This survey presents some sampling 
difficulties. Since the evaluation was designed after the implementation began, 
there are no baseline data, thereby causing lower credibility in the estimations. 
In order to solve this problem, and with the goal of collecting the variables that 
determine the mechanism by which beneficiaries are admitted into the program 
(hereafter referred to as the admission mechanism), apart from PCHS the evalu-
ation was complemented with administrative data from the Puente Program and 
from the CAS2 databases, an instrument used at the time to assign State benefits 
(administered yearly to more than 25% of the population). The evaluation con-
ducted using the administrative data is the primary focus of the paper.
The evaluation design is non-experimental, based on the Matching technique. 
In order to estimate the impact via Matching in a valid form, it is necessary 
to identify all of the variables determining participation in a program. In this 
particular case, there are characteristics of the families and of the districts3 in 
which these families live that determine the probability these families have to 
be invited to participate in the program. After carrying out an extensive analysis 
on the admission mechanism it was determined that nearly all of the relevant 
variables had been captured.
Results from the Chile Solidario Panel are obtained using the Matching 
approach. In most cases it is possible to carry out differences-in-differences 
analyses with the Chile Solidario Panel. However, in some cases, especially 
in the take-up of social programs and psychosocial results, it is only possible 
to find results using cross-sectional estimations for 2006. These results are 
mostly positive. Also, some negative results for areas such as poverty and 
indigence in cross-sectional estimations have been found for 2006. However, 
the results show that when it is possible to contrast the similarities prior to the 
implementation of the program between the treatment group and the controls 
using administrative data, in a big proportion of the cases important differences 
can be found before the start of the program between both groups. This implies 
that estimations performed using only the Chile Solidario Panel will likely be 
seriously questionable.
In order to overcome the problems of the Chile Solidario Panel described 
above, a new evaluation was carried out which merged all of the available ad-
ministrative databases. A panel with seven rounds was generated, with around 
1,000,000 records for each round. However, there are also shortcomings to this 
approach, such as the non-random attrition and the measurement error, but the 
evaluation overall is much more reliable. There is a substantial rate of participa-
tion in Chile Solidario in the control group, so different strategies to overcome 
this problem are discussed. A simple extension to the standard solution substitu-
2  CAS measures resource availability and it breaks down into Housing, Income, Employment 
and Education scores.
3  The program has a decentralized management model, so it is executed at the comuna 
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tion bias is adopted. The results show a mixture of small positive and negative 
effects on some variables, while other important variables, such as those related 
to employment, have small but clear positive effects.
The evaluation of Chile Solidario presented several challenges, but these 
challenges also provided valuable lessons to consider when implementing impact 
evaluations in developing countries. Those lessons include the need to create 
evaluations as soon as programs are designed, the need to extensively document 
all long-term decisions carried out, the importance of keeping the questions on 
the questionnaires over time, the usefulness of verifying ID’s in the location 
where the survey was administered, the need to deeply understand the program 
when designing the instruments to be used, the opportunities that are given by 
the use of administrative data, etc. All of the problems encountered may appear 
in future impact evaluations; therefore, systematizing these problems may prove 
a useful guide to organizations wanting to evaluate their programs. In addition 
to these lessons, the information available to program executives makes the 
Impact Evaluation a valuable exercise.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In section 2 the Chile Solidario 
Protection System is described. In section 3 the admission mechanism to the 
system is thoroughly explained, so as to justify the non-experimental techniques 
used in the evaluation. Section 4 assesses the validity of the identification strategy. 
Section 5 describes the data that are used. Section 6 provides a description of the 
methodology used in the evaluation. Section 7 presents the results using the Chile 
Solidario Panel database. Section 8 describes the Administrative Panel Database. 
Section 9 describes the criteria for choosing the control group from that database. 
Section 10 describes the results obtained from the Administrative Panel. Section 
11 concludes and systematizes the lessons for future evaluations.
2.  Chile Solidario Social Protection System
During the 1990s, Chile went through a fast decline in poverty levels. The 
total poverty index decreased 15.4 points in six years. Extreme poverty in the 
same period was reduced by more than half. However, from 1996 to 2000 and 
to 2003 there was relative stagnation in the poverty figures. Chile Solidario 
was created as a response to the determination that the pace and volume of the 
extreme poverty figures were stagnated since 1996. Fortunately, from 2003 to 
2006 there was a new important reduction in non-extreme poverty levels, going 
from 18.7% to 13.7% and of extreme poverty, from 4.7% to 3.2%. It is of major 
public interest to quantify in what way Chile Solidario was responsible for this 
important progress.
The Social Protection System Chile Solidario (from now on CHS) was a 
pioneering initiative in Chile in two dimensions. It was the first governmental 
program to address poverty in a multidimensional way, and it was also the first 
large-scale public policy to undergo an impact evaluation. Besides, social pro-
grams and benefits were not focused, and there was a lack of mechanisms and 
safety nets that would help to avoid loss of income and to mitigate the effects of 
unforeseen circumstances suffered by the poorest families. The program is run 
by MIDEPLAN, the anti-poverty department of the Government of Chile.
The families remain in the System for a 5-year period. During this time an 
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FIGURE 1
EVOLUTION OF POVERTy AND ExTREME POVERTy 1990-2006
Source: MIDEPLAN.
i)  Psychosocial Support and Protection Bonus
  Psychosocial Support consists of personalized mentoring, in 21 sessions over 
a two year period, given to enrolled families by a specially trained professional 
(“Family Support”). During this mentoring, mutual commitments are established. 
Moreover, the professional helps with the procedures for the respective bonuses 
and subsidies to which the beneficiaries are entitled, and also helps them to 
access a varied group of locally implemented social programs that the State 
has put at their disposal. Additionally, the law contemplates that the families 
enrolled in Chile Solidario will receive a monetary bonus, whose amount de-
creases from US$ 21 per month during the first year to approximately US$ 12 
per month in the fifth year.
ii)  Guaranteed Access to Monetary Subsidies
  Monetary subsidies are guaranteed, as long as they remain in the system, for 
everyone fulfilling the requirements. There are 4 different money transfers 
people may apply to4, each with different requirements.
4  People may apply to SUF (around US$10 a month, given for each child, pregnant woman); 
SAP (Drinkable Water Subsidy); PASIS (around US$100 a month, given to elderly or 
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iii) Preferential Access to Assistance and Social Promotion Programs
  The beneficiaries of Chile Solidario have priority of access to these social 
services. In order to ensure the preferential access, MIDEPLAN establishes 
assistance agreements with many public services for enrolled families. As 
an example, some benefits5 are specified: Health assistance free of charge 
in public health services; preferential access to Training Programs; prefe-
rential access to the Support Program for Small Businesses.
Chile Solidario was created in order to reduce extreme poverty in Chile. 
The program has defined a set of intermediate objectives in seven different 
areas for each family. This evaluation focuses on two of the most difficult 
areas from which to obtain results: employment and income.
Costs Associated with the Chile Solidario System
In terms of budget, Chile Solidario has grown strongly, growing from 
around US$ 5 million in 2002 to more than US$ 140 million in 2007, using 
total resources equivalent to around 0.1% of that year’s GDP.
3.  Admission Mechanism
A complete understanding of the mechanism by which families enter the 
program is fundamental to determine feasible identification strategies and the 
assumptions that must be used in the evaluation.
Chile Solidario was created as a Social Protection System targeting people 
living in conditions of extreme poverty. As a consequence, 225,0816 program 
slots were originally assigned for the period 2002-2005 (a number that was 
thought to be enough to cover the total number of indigent families). Later, 
more slots were opened in the system. As of November 2006, the last date this 
evaluation covers, the program included a total of 252,586 families7.
Since the plan was to cover the population living in extreme poverty, and 
due to the fact that there was no clear way to distinguish between indigent and 
non-indigent families using the CAS score, it was decided to use the district 
and regional indigence percentages obtained through the CASEN survey (a 
5  The broken down detail for 2005 corresponds to the information contained in the Chile 
Solidario Information book Nº 2 (Cuaderno de Información Nº 2 Chile Solidario) 
(MIDEPLAN). Only a few examples are named, but there are a wide variety of agree-
ments between MIDEPLAN and other public sector institutions regarding the preferential 
access of the program beneficiaries 
6  “Cobertura de Chile Solidario por Región 2002-2005 Final”. Secretaría Ejecutiva de Chile 
Solidario, Excel File.
7  Base Puente Personas, May 2007. Includes Families and One-Person Households consti-
tuted by Old Age People. It includes active families (families that completed the program) 
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national households survey) in order to determine a CAS cutoff such that a 
similar percentage of the district population was eligible for the program. 
This led to the adoption of different CAS cutoff scores by district. Families 
whose CAS score was less than the maximum of either their district’s or their 
region’s cutoff scores were eligible for the program.
Since different cutoff scores were established in districts all over the 
country8, it is possible to use non-experimental strategies for the evaluation, 
such as matching, in which it is mandatory that the treatment and the control 
group are comparable. Both this impact evaluation of Chile Solidario and 
the previous ones have exploited the fact that families having identical CAS 
scores are or are not eligible for the program, depending on the district in 
which they live.
Once the effective cutoff scores by district have been established, it is 
possible to know who is eligible for Chile Solidario. However, there were not 
necessarily program slots available for all eligible families. The number of slots 
available for each district was decided in the following manner: Based on the 
effective cutoff scores, the potential demand of Chile Solidario beneficiaries 
in CAS databases was estimated; this corresponded to 298,409 families9. 
Since the budget was only available for 225,081 slots, in most cases a lower 
amount to the potential demand was assigned to each district. The way the total 
number of places by district was assigned, and their distribution through time, 
were the result of a discretional analysis process, taken case by case in each 
district, based on the real possibilities they would have to give psychosocial 
support to a certain amount of families. Some of the factors considered were 
the number of public employees counted on by the district administration10, 
the geographical characteristics of the district, etc. Once the cutoff scores 
and the distribution of the yearly slots were determined, the families with the 
smallest CAS score had priority.
Given this information, we should see more people with higher CAS scores 
being admitted into the program over time. Figure 2 shows such a pattern. 
Each mark represents a family entering the program. The x-axis displays the 
entry date. The y-axis presents the CAS score for the family. There is a marked 
increase from the first to the later years. However, this does not happen in all 
cases, due to two reasons: 1) Each district’s CAS database is continuously 
updated. 2) The law establishes that in those cases where the families in the 
initial list are too dispersed in location inside the district, it will be possible 
to distribute families between the Familiar Supports at geographical conve-
nience, even though they were not families with smaller scores. In practice, 
it can be observed that the scores of people admitted to the program can even 
8  Chile has 346 districts.
9  Amount obtained in 2001 CAS Conglomerate of the addition through the communes of 
the families eligible for the program.
10  The administration of the Comunas (districts) are called on this paper Municipalidades 
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show a uniform pattern through time (Figure 3). This phenomenon is relevant 
for the evaluation, as it explains why after many years of the system being in 
practice there is still common support (that in fact makes matching possible). 
It is worth mentioning that the districts strictly respect the prohibition on 
including beneficiaries whose score is over the cutoff score, as is shown by 
the fact that no more that 2% of beneficiaries appear in the database with CAS 
scores exceeding the effective cutoff of their district.
It can be concluded that, for a family, the variables having influence on their 
program participation are their CAS score, the cutoff score obtained by their 
district, the amount of slots assigned for that district, and the rate of assigned 
slots/original slots, which is related to the management capacities of each district. 
Another variable that might be relevant is the geographic isolation of the family 
and the capacity of that family to have influence on the district administration’s 
employees to be included in the program. Chile Solidario executives believe this 
last variable may not be relevant since there has never been a massive demand 
for inclusion in the program.
FIGURE 2
BENEFICIARy ADMISSION PATTERN, LOS ANGELES DISTRICT
Source: Own elaboration using Puente Base, May 2007.
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FIGURE 3
ADMISSION PATTERN FOR BENEFICIARIES, TEMUCO DISTRICT
Source: Own elaboration using Puente Base, May 2007.
4.  Validity of the Identification Strategy
The identification strategy used to measure CHS impact is based on the 
existence of different families that have the same probability, conditioned on 
a group of variables, of entering the program, some of them are admitted and 
some others are not, due to exogenous reasons. There are three situations where 
different families with a similar CAS are not all included in the program: 1) the 
treatment group has a marginally lower CAS score; 2) the treatment group and 
controls have the same score but they live in different districts with different 
cutoff scores; and 3) both families have the same CAS score and live in the 
same district, but due to unknown reasons, one of them receives treatment and 
the other does not. This third situation presents a new issue as to whether the 
reasons families are admitted into the program are indeed external.
This evaluation is going to be carried out by Matching (see section 6). The 
fundamental assumption of that methodology is unconfoundedness. Under this 
assumption, all factors relating treatment assignment with the potential outcome 
are observable11. As an example, let’s suppose those in the treatment group come 
mainly from districts where the public services provided are better-than-average 
11  “Estimation of Average Treatment Effects Under Unconfoundedness”. Imbens, G. en 
Imbens & Wooldridge (What’s new in econometrics, Lecture Notes 1, Summer 2007).
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quality. On the other hand, let’s suppose those in the control group come from 
all kind of districts with equal opportunity. In case of not being able to measure 
the quality of the public services, the mentioned effect would contaminate the 
program’s estimated impact because what would be measured would be better 
quality of public services + program impact. Next, it is discussed whether that 
assumption is fulfilled for this evaluation.
The factors having an influence over the probability of treatment have been 
classified intofour groups. Individual and district variables are considered, 
since both can affect the probability of treatment. If on top of that they have 
an influence over the potential outcome, any of these variables can be a source 
of bias if the program impact is not controlled. In the following table there are 
examples of variables in each of the categories that could have an influence over 
the likelihood of admission to the program:
TABLE 1
FACTORS THAT COULD DETERMINE THE PARTICIPATION ON THE PROGRAM
Observable Unobservable
Individuals CA score Motivation; Closeness to the district 
administration
Districts Cutoff score and slots 
available
District administration management 
capabilities
Observable individual variables: The only individual-level characteristic ex-
plaining his/her participation in the program, according to the rules, is the CAS 
score. CAS score is related to the socioeconomic level, hence it is important to 
control for when evaluating the program.
Observable communal variables: The only district characteristics explaining the 
probability that an individual living in that district takes part in the program are 
the district cutoff score and the number of program slots available in the district. 
Both variables can be related to the potential outcome. The number of places 
has been decided considering the quality of the public service. Hence, besides 
controlling for the number of slots it is necessary to capture, in some way, the 
quality of public service in the district that is unobservable on the data.
Unobservable individual variables: When families are invited to participate 
in the program they can choose to accept or not. This can be a first cause of 
violation to the assumption of unconfoundedness (self-selection). However, 
the rate of rejection of enrolment in the program is around 1%, so even if that 
factor exists it is not very relevant. The invitations to the program within each 
district were based on the CAS score, with the exception of those cases where 
in geographical terms it was more efficient to group beneficiary families. For 
this reason, a family’s geographical accessibility is an unobservable variable 
in the data that determines the probability of being treated. This could be a 
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to control for this potential bias, so it will only be possible to isolate it assuming 
that it did not change in time and estimating through differences-in-differences, 
as explained in the methodology section. The third potential violation of the 
assumption of unconfoundedness occurs when the individual’s motivation can 
affect the probability of being invited to participate in the program. This could 
bias the evaluation outcomes. According to Chile Solidario workers, until the 
end of year 2003, there was scarce public awareness of the program’s existence, 
so people could hardly go to the Municipalities and ask to be included.
Unobservable communal variables: The only moment there was a subjective 
process affecting the chance to participate was when the number of slots per 
district was assigned (See section 3). As described in section 3 of this document, 
the potential demand had been set at 298,409 families, whereas for budgetary 
reasons 225,000 slots were given. The manner in which the total of these 
places per district was assigned and their distribution in time was the result of a 
case-by-case analysis of the districts and their real possibilities to provide psy-
chosocial support to a high number of families. This could be a fourth violation 
of the unconfoundedness assumption. This last selection process is important 
in magnitude, given that 30% of the potential beneficiaries were not included. 
The problem that may arise from this procedure would be, for example, that the 
beneficiaries were grouped in districts with better public management capabilities. 
In this case, the beneficiaries would be in districts with characteristics that are 
different from the controls and this difference would not be noticeable. As has 
been noted, the only moment there were decisions based on unobservables that 
could have an influence at the same time in the assignment of places and in the 
quality of services rendered by the district was when the assignment of places 
per district was decided. One possibility of isolating that decision process is to 
control for the manner in which the decision-maker determines the capability 
of the district to provide quality support to families: taking the total of available 
slots for the program (from the CAS databases) and calculating the proportion 
of those slots effectively given to the district, we can quantify the subjective 
aspects the program workers considered. Given that this measure was the only 
way the program workers had an influence on the probability of participation, 
by controlling for this variable, the identification strategy becomes valid.
5.  Data
Puente Databases: The Planning Ministry (MIDEPLAN) is in charge of mana-
ging the Chile Solidario System. Puente databases are used as a tool to handle 
program management, which includes all the beneficiaries of the program, their 
identification numbers and their CAS scores, among other variables.
The Chile Solidario Panel Survey (CHSP) is the survey on which this evaluation 
is based, and was specifically designed for the impact evaluation. The panel is a 
longitudinal survey, composed of beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of the system. 
The information gathered contains questions about demographic characteristics, 
education, health, employment, income, housing, family information and a ps-
ychosocial module. In general, the questionnaire is very detailed, its only flaw 
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questions on the use of benefits specific to the program. The rounds used in this 
evaluation are for the years 2003, 2004 and 200612. Despite being a longitudinal 
survey, the follow-up unit and protocols to minimize attrition were only determined 
in 2006. The main characteristics of the sample are detailed below.
The Puente program started in mid-year 2002. Only a year after, planning 
for the program evaluation was initiated, and it was decided to use the CASEN 
2003 survey as the first round of CHSP. In order to identify the treatment group 
for the Chile Solidario Panel the question from the CASEN survey “Does your 
family participate in the Chile Solidario program?” was used. After an extensive 
process intended to correct the Identification Numbers13, it became clear that 
that variable had an important level of measurement error when compared to 
the administrative data from Chile Solidario, with an inclusion error of about 
6% and an exclusion error of about 15%. Another problem was that the ID 
numbers were not checked at the time the data were collected, which led to a 
high probability that those numbers were not correct.
Additionally, a complementary sample of homes that benefitted from Chile 
Solidario was added using data obtained from Puente Bases. For the years 2004 
and 2006 beneficiaries belonging to the program’s most recent cohorts were 
added, who had been surveyed in CASEN 2003. The control group was selected 
by matching, but there were no appropriate administrative variables available at 
that time and some regional restrictions were imposed on the matching. Due to 
budgetary reasons all those observations having missings in the variables used in 
the propensity score estimation were excluded as well as those of beneficiaries 
having no control families with a similar probability of program participation 
(those being outside the common support). The sample was stratified in 2004, 
according to the demographic distribution of the beneficiaries included in Puente 
Base in July 2004. In the end, for the 2006 round, enrolled families that did 
not have a CAS record were excluded. Due to the successive stratifications and 
to the fact that the new cohorts were not added in a way that is proportional to 
their magnitude, it is not clear whether this panel is representative of the actual 
CHS population.
Of note, a series of changes in the questions included in the PCHS question-
naire were made over the three rounds. It was necessary for evaluation purposes 
to carry out an extensive data standardization process in order to make the three 
rounds compatible. The scale of the changes was such that the questionnaire in 
the psychosocial section is not comparable between the years 2004 and 2006.
TABLE 2










Source: Chile Solidario Panel 2003-2006.
12  Currently the 2007 round of the panel is available.
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CAS record: The CAS record was the instrument used up to 2006 to select the 
beneficiaries of the targeted social programs. It contains relevant information 
including ID number, zone, district, current month’s income, employment, 
housing, education, etc. The CAS records expired after two years. The CAS 
record with the information of the families is stored in the CAS database. These 
bases contain information from all records that were still valid up to December 
of the calendar year of the CAS database. As an example, the CAS database 
2001 contains information for all families that applied for a CAS record bet-
ween January 1999 and December 2001. Each CAS database covers about 6 
million individuals, including approximately 75% of families living in extreme 
poverty conditions14.
The main problem of Chile Solidario Panel is the lack of baseline data. As a 
way of partially addressing this problem, in this evaluation the databases from 
the years 2000 to 2005 have been put together, in order to have pre-treatment 
data available on the program.
6.  Methodology Used in the Evaluation
When Chile Solidario was designed, the creation of an experimental control 
group15 was not considered. The most proper way, statistically, to evaluate a 
program’s impact is to perform an evaluation with a control group of that kind. 
When not being able to use experimental methods, some kind of non-experimental 
method to estimate the impact is required. Considering that the characteristics 
determining eligibility in Chile Solidario are not random, the Propensity Score 
Matching is used to build up a counterfactual scenario.
Matching methodology has a long history in non-experimental studies of 
impact evaluation. (Rosenbaum & Rubin (1983); LaLonde (1986); Dehejia & 
Wahba (1998); Abadie and Imbens (2006)) and nowadays it is still considered 
a valid way of estimation that is being continuously improved Blundell & Costa 
Dias (2002); Imbens (2004); Heckman, Ichimura & Todd (1997)). Matching is 
applied to identify an adequate control group whenever this group cannot be 
built up from randomization of the intervention.
Conceptually, the propensity score matching method consists of looking for 
a control for each treatment group member that is identical in terms of his/her 
probability of participation in the program. Once the sample of non-beneficiaries 
has been chosen, and having fulfilled the fundamental assumptions of the method, 
the conditions for a natural experiment are re-established. The use of matching 
to determine a program effect requires two assumptions:
14  Estimation by Osvaldo Larrañaga based on CASEN 2003.
15  A group of experimental controls is one that has been randomly selected between the 
potential participants in a system, so that, statistically, it has the same characteristics as 
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Unconfoundedness assumption: The assignment to treatment (D) is orthogonal 
to the potential results conditioned on a group of noticeable x variables. The 
conditioning is performed only on observable variables, which have to be collec-
ted before the program may alter them. In other words, if the unconfoundedness 
assumption is fulfilled, the results of the non-treated families behave similarly 
to those of treated families for the cases when they have not participated in the 
program. This assumption is not possible to prove, since the potential result (Yi) 
is not known before the intervention.
In the section 4 (Validity of the Identification Strategy) an extensive dis-
cussion was presented about the scenarios where it is possible to consider this 
assumption as true. Given such discussion, the variables to which we had access 
and that would influence admission to the program would be: the family’s CAS 
score16, the cutoff score of the district, the number of places available in the 
district at the time of evaluation and the proxy measurement regarding man-
agement capacity. This basic theoretical specification was empirically tested, 
as the difference in pre-treatment17 variables between the treatment group and 
the control group was measured. The unconfoundedness assumption cannot 
be easily assessed using the Chile Solidario Panel, so it was necessary to use 
the pre-treatment variables available on the CAS records to have a more solid 
comparison point between treated and control families. The matching specifica-
tion using the theoretical model attained a medium level of similarity between 
the treatment group and the control group. A pre-treatment imbalance on the 
“Number of persons in the family” variable was confirmed after successive 
tests, among other variables18. Tests with more and with fewer variables were 
carried out, modifying the number of neighbours and using kernel and calliper 
matching. No specification had a better match than the basic model. Considering 
the importance of the number of people in a family, it was decided this would 
be included in the p-score identification. In total, 13 models were tested, but 
the original theoretical specification was kept, with the addition of the number 
of people in each family.
These first tests are just a beginning for checking pre-treatment consis-
tency. Effort is put on the Results Section to make it possible to determine 
whether this assumption may be feasible, using more pre-treatment variables 
and more outcomes. If after matching there are still significant differences in 
important pre-treatment variables, the method may not be valid fordetermin-
ing program impacts.
16  The CAS score used was the latest score before the entry to the program for the treatment 
group. For each control family we chose their CAS record that was closest to the average 
survey date of the treatment group.
17  This is equivalent to testing whether the control group and the treatment group are statisti-
cally equal before the program.
18  Head of the family education level and the zone also appeared with pre-treatment 
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Common Support Assumption: Let S be the set defined for all beneficiary families 
that have a propensity score close enough19 to the score of at least one control 
family. There is common support if S is non-void. This second assumption 
guarantees that the required comparison group exists, i.e. at least a subset of the 
treated families has a match in the group of non-treated families, where each 
one of the control group members is a potential candidate for participating in 
the program. The range of the Propensity Score for which there are treatment 
and control families is called Common Support and the matching-estimated 
parameters will only be valid for the on-common support group, not for all the 
sample.
The principal reason why there is an overlap on the distributions of the 
propensity scores of both groups (treatment and control) is that the cutoff scores 
for Chile Solidario were set by district, using criteria that made it possible for 
two identical families to have different eligibility status.
Taking into account all of the previous precautions the propensity score 
for the treatment and control group was estimated. The result is presented 
here in Figure 4:
Methodological Decisions
The identification strategy used to measure the impact of CHS is based on 
the fact that there are many families that had the same probability (conditioned 
to a group of variables) of being enrolled in the program; some of them are 
enrolled and some are not due to external reasons.
Considering the method by which people were enrolled in the program, 
in order to build up the counterfactual group and to determine the impact on 
homes participating in the System, the Propensity Score Matching20 method-
ology is used. The fundamental assumption of matching is that all the factors 
relating the treatment assignment to the potential result are observed as in 
Imbens and Wooldridge (2007). Nearest Neighbour Matching with 4 neigh-
bours is being used, following the suggestions given by Imbens (2004). The 
regression discontinuity approach was also considered, but since the number 
of observations from Chile Solidario Panel is limited, the estimations were 
extremely unstable.
19  The definition of what is “close enough” often is a decision that comes up from the empirical 
work.
20  Despite the fact that the non-beneficiary sample had been originally obtained by matching, 
those data would not necessarily match with the new control group, due to many reasons, 
including: the original matching was regionally severely restricted; the variables used in 
the original p-score matching were CASEN only, in this case however RUTs (IDs) were 
available in order to use the CAS score; in the original matching no communal variables 
were used; and finally, in the original matching self report was used to define the condi-
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a.  Parameter to Be Estimated
Inside the Chile Solidario Panel it is possible to estimate program results 
using the differences-in-differences or cross-sectional approaches. Given the 
lack of a baseline, both approaches present problems. In order to select the 
appropriate analysis approach, we will assume that it is possible to divide the 
program impact into two parts, the impact before the baseline is taken (beginning 
with the family entering the program to November 2003, when the first survey 
was conducted) and the impact from November 2003 until November 2006 
(date of the last panel round used). If only one cross-section is measured, this 
will show the final difference between the two groups, relying on matching to 
assume that both would be identical before the treatment. In the results section 
it will be shown that this is not necessarily true. If differences-in-differences is 
used we can only obtain the progress from one point to another in the treatment. 
This can be interesting, but it strongly depends on the sequence in which the 
program impacts the beneficiaries. For example, if people greatly improve for 
a given result at the beginning of the program, but this improvement is partly 
temporal, the result the differences-in-differences estimation may deliver can 
be negative, even though the program has a positive effect overall. Whenever 
possible, both approaches will be used on this paper.
FIGURE 4
DISTRIBUTION OF PROPENSITy SCORE FOR TREATMENT AND CONTROL GROUP
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b.  Grouping the participants and non-participants according to survey date 
and date of admission to the program
When estimating the program impact it is necessary to clearly determine the 
definition used for “participating in the program” that is being considered, so that 
the impacts found can be correctly interpreted, thus enabling policy decision-
making. The whole Chile Solidario program contemplates a two-year Puente 
program, with active psychosocial support and then, a three-year follow up, 
where people still receives the benefits of preferential access to public programs 
and the monetary bonus, but the psychosocial support is taken away.
The treatment group that, at the moment of the poll during the year 2006, had 
been for about four years in the program (cohorts 1 to 10 of the program) will be 
the group considered in the analysis. Those people surveyed between March 2002 
and March 2003 were included in the analysis, since the Chile Solidario Panel 
rounds are taken in November and a minimum amount of time must take place 
before the families start to receive the program benefits. Given this definition 
and the way the CAS databases are grouped, enrolled families included in this 
evaluation spent an average of 38 months in the program. In order to make the 
treatment and control groups possible to compare, some proximity was sought 
between the survey date on the CAS record for the treatment group, with which 
they entered to the program, and the CAS survey date of the controls. In short, 
for each control family, the CAS record that is nearest to the average date of 
the treatment group survey is taken.
c.  Definition of Treated
The Puente databases were used for the administrative identification of the 
treatment group. All beneficiaries enrolled in Chile Solidario are identified by 
their RUT (ID). These people and their families were excluded as potential 
controls in this evaluation. However, in order to be included in the treatment 
group the administrative definition of the program was applied: Treated families 
were those in which the recipient of the Chile Solidario Bonus lives.
7.  Results using the Chile Solidario Panel
In section 7.1 the results in the variables of Chile Solidario Panel are shown, 
which are also available in CAS records21. The variables on the CAS record 
are the best available proxy of a baseline. The variables being used here are the 
amount of people in each family, the labour income and employment. For each 
of them an average group of results is presented: years 2003 and 2006 of Chile 
Solidario Panel, which this evaluation is based on; the average in both groups 
in CAS records 2001 and 2002, in order to show if there are any pre-treatment 
differences between the groups that are not attributable to the program; the result 
of CAS groups 2005, because it is comparable to our pre-treatment variables. 
Then, the CAS 2003 result is presented in order to examine the comparability 
between PCHS and CAS record variables. In the end, the differences for CAS 
records are presented between the years 2005 and 2002 and for Chile Solidario 
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Panel between the years 2006 and 2003. In some cases, when it is possible to 
sum up the results of a variable without showing the tables, these are omitted to 
make the presentation shorter. The review of this first group of variables will set 
the basis to evaluate the credibility of this evaluation: if important pre-treatment 
differences are found, the results in the variables that are not on CAS record 
will be, by extension, hardly credible.
In section 7.2 the results in the variables that are not available on CAS 
records are shown. Among these variables we can find the take-up of subsidies 
and social programs, and also variables including income by subsidies, such 
as Extreme poverty and poverty. In these cases only the results for the rounds 
2006 and 2003 of Chile Solidario Panel and the differences between both of 
them are presented
In section 7.3 the results in perception variables are shown, which are only 
available for the year 2006 in Chile Solidario Panel.
7.1.  Variables available on the CAS record
Number of people in the family: This is one of the most important variables for 
the evaluation, since a lot of the calculated outputs are formulated based on the 
per capita or family total. As can be seen in the selection of variables for the 
propensity score (section 6), “Number of People in the Family” is included in the 
propensity score. However, as is shown in Table 3, this is not enough to ensure 
there is no pre-treatment impact. Significant impacts can be observed both in 
the valid22 number of people in the family as in almost every year. However, 
the differences-in-differences results are not significant, suggesting that the 
differences were not the result of the program. Due to this persistent difference 
between the treatment group and the control group, both per capita variables 
and per family variables may be biased.
TABLE 3
# of people in the family Impact t Mean T Mean C N
CAS 2001 0.162 1.531 4.324 4.163 1368
CAS 2002 0.297 2.735 4.303 4.007 1320
CAS 2003 0.341 3.454 4.318 3.977 1505
CAS 2005 0.480 5.068 4.665 4.185 1698
PCHS 2003 0.590 6.106 4.600 4.009 1698
PCHS 2006 0.119 1.169 3.511 3.392 1047
Dif-Dif PCHS 2006-2003 0.085 0.900 –0.167 –0.252 1320
Dif-DifCAS2005-2002 0.110 1.625 –0.065 –0.176 1698
Head of the family employment: Significant pre-treatment differences are ob-
served favoring the treatment group. The differences-in-differences estimation 
22  The “valid” survey refers to the number of people the family had in their latest CAS record 
before entering the program, for the case of beneficiaries, and to the people the family 
had in their CAS record, which is closest to the average date the survey was taken for the 
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in the CAS record is significant against the treatment group. While employment 
for the control group rose by 5% in the period, employment in the treatment 
group slightly decreased.
Income of the Head of the family: It is possible to estimate the impact on income 
with greater confidence, since there are no pre-treatment impacts in any of the 
years. Surprisingly, considering the previous result for employment, a positive 
and significant effect can be found in the head of the family’s income for the 
difference in incomes in Chile Solidario Panel.
TABLE 4
Job Income Head of HhId Impact t Mean T Mean C N
CAS 2001 –$    574 –0.097 $ 68,786   $ 69,360 1239
CAS 2002 –$ 2,313 –0.473 $ 66,156   $ 68,469 1132
CAS 2003   $ 7,041 1.420 $ 69,787   $ 62,746 1365
CAS 2005 –$   133 –0.031 $ 69,205   $ 69,338 1132
PCHS 2003 –$ 8,220 –1.932 $ 50,501   $ 58,721 1698
PCHS 2006   $ 2,331 0.581 $ 58,789   $ 56,458 1698
Dif-Dif CAS 2005-2002   $ 2,180 0.412 $   3,049   $     869 1132
Dif-Dif PCHS 2006-2003   $ 10,551 2.390 $   8,288 –$ 2,263 1698
Number of people employed in the family: There are no pre-treatment impacts, 
so the number of people employed by family can be estimated with relative con-
fidence. Both panels coincide in 2003, which is the only year where significant 
differences can be found between both groups; however, these differences are 
not maintained in subsequent years.
Percentage of employed people: There are pre-treatment impacts in all measurements 
during the first years, so it is not possible to obtain accurate conclusions.
Family Income: While possible to estimate this impact, no significant impacts 
were found. The most notorious point is the difference between the impact in 
the years 2003 and 2006 favouring the treated group. However, this difference 
of $12,325 does not translate into a significant impact.
TABLE 5
Labor Income Impact t Mean T Mean C N
CAS 2001 –$   3,773 –0.535 $   94,242 $   98,015 1285
CAS 2002 –$ 12,786 –1.878 $   90,850 $ 103,637 1143
CAS 2003   $   3,587 0.637 $   92,685 $   89,097 1413
CAS 2005 –$ 10,768 –1.626 $   98,194 $ 108,962 1143
PCHS 2003 –$ 11,514 –1.860 $   97,695 $ 109,209 1698
PCHS 2006   $      811 0.117 $ 122,378 $ 121,568 1698
Dif-Dif CAS 2005-2002   $   2,018 0.256 $     7,344 $     5,325 1143
Dif-Dif PCHS 2006-2003   $  12,325 1.745 $   24,683 $    12,359 1698Estudios de Economía, Vol. 38 - Nº 1 148
Number of working women: There are no pre-treatment impacts and there is 
a certain effect in year 2003 on the treatment group that disappears with time. 
This effect leads to a negative differences-in-differences estimate.
Percentage of working women: There are pre-treatment effects for this impact; 
however, the differences are considerable in year 2003 in the Chile Solidario 
Panel, while after this period the effects disappear.
CAS Score: There are significant pre-treatment differences. These differences 
appear to be widening with time, but conclusions at this point cannot be clearly 
drawn.
7.2.  Variables only available in Chile Solidario Panel
Given the results presented in the previous part, the results presented here must 
be handled with a lot of caution, since it is likely that the initial levels between 
treatment group and the controls are not identical. This is problematic, because 
most important variables in the program, such as Extreme Poverty and Poverty 
are included in this category. In the case of variables related to the take-up of 
subsidies and social programs, the calculations are based on the percentage of 
eligible individuals receiving the benefit.
Indigence and Poverty: The same logic is given for both variables. For both va-
riables, strong negative impacts can be found within the cross-section. However, 
it is highly probable that those impacts are due to pre-treatment differences 
between the treatment group and the controls.
TABLE 6
% in Extreme Poverty Impact t Mean T Mean C N
PCHS 2003 0.115 5.435 0.341 0.226 1698
PCHS 2006 0.093 4.610 0.290 0.196 1698
Dif-Dif PCHS 2006-2003 –0.022 –0.852 –0.051 –0.029 1698
% in Poverty
PCHS 2003 0.156 6.600 0.730 0.574 1698
PCHS 2006 0.185 7.630 0.638 0.453 1698
Dif-Dif PCHS 2006-2003 0.029 1.001 –0.092 –0.121 1698
Income through Subsidy: The differences-in-differences result is negative, but 
it is composed of two positive results for cross section of the treatment group. 
This is likely due to the fact that people in the treatment group received more 
subsidies than did the controls during the psychosocial support stage, but that 
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TABLE 7
Income through Subsidy Impact t Mean T Mean C N
PCHS 2003   $ 6,005 5.609   $ 27,868 $ 21,863 1698
PCHS 2006   $ 2,948 2.243   $ 26,321 $ 23,373 1698
Dif-Dif PCHS 2006-2003 –$ 3,057 –2.758  –$   1,547 $   1,510 1698
Total income and net income of the Chile Solidario bonus: This comparison table 
provides a good example as to how a temporary benefit given by the program 
can provide wrong signs when baselines are not available. The first table shows 
$ 8,621 as the impact of the program. However, this impact is reduced with 
the retirement of the Chile Solidario cash transfer, which decreases its amount 
with time. Despite the fact that in this case the impacts in general do not reach 
a significant level, it is worth mentioning, so as to be aware of what can happen 
when benefits are given to the beneficiaries and then are taken away.
TABLE 8
Total Income Impact t Mean T Mean C N
PCHS 2003 –$ 11,052 –1.639 $ 145,651 $ 156,702 1698
PCHS 2006 –$   2,431 –0.339 $ 168,100 $ 170,531 1698
Dif-Dif PCHS 2006-2003   $   8,621 1.107 $   22,449 $   13,829 1698
Net Income (of CHS bonus)
PCHS 2003 –$ 18,276 –2.711 $ 138,071 $ 156,346 1698
PCHS 2006 –$   5,587 –0.780 $ 164,826 $ 170,413 1698
Dif-Dif PCHS 2006-2003   $ 12,688 1.629 $   26,755 $   14,067 1698
Training: We can see an important change in tendency, where the treatment 
group started with more training and finished with less. This is a clear example 
of the need to have information on previous years, since it is highly probable that 
the treatment group received more training in the years of the Puente intensive 
phase, and thereafter received less training, which can be incorrectly seen as a 
negative dif-dif.
TABLE 9
% in Job Training Impact t Mean T Mean C N
PCHS 2003 0.044 4.926 0.094 0.050 1698
PCHS 2006 –0.025 –2.262 0.062 0.087 1698
Dif-Dif PCHS 2006-2003 –0.069 –5.088 –0.032 0.037 1698Estudios de Economía, Vol. 38 - Nº 1 150
Preschool Coverage, School Coverage, and Adult Preventive Health Control: 
For all these variables, no significant results were found.
Registration in the Health System, Medical Practice, Gynaecological Examination, 
Adult Preventive Control and Basic Coverage: These variables present some 
impacts using the cross-sectional analysis, but they do not present impacts in the 
differences-in-differences analysis. Since we do not have pre-treatment variables 
it is not clear whether it is possible to confer causality to these results.
Dental Attention: There are positive impacts of the program in a very clear 
way, whether analyzed using the differences-in-differences or cross-sectional 
approach.
7.3.  Variables that are only present in the 2006 round
Take-up of social programs: These variables are only available for the 2006 
round of the Panel. There is a big impact in OMIL registration and in the par-
ticipation in the employment programs. Despite of not counting on the groups 
initial statistics, these are powerful signals on the program being effective in 
contacting the families with the public programs.
TABLE 10
% usage of public ss (2006) Impact t Mean T Mean C N
Health Benefits 0.016 0.394 0.268 0.253 315
OMIL registration 0.135 10.979 0.217 0.082 1698
Participation in the
employment programs 0.015 2.677 0.035 0.020 1698
Psychosocial Welfare: One of the most important components of Chile Solidario 
is the psychosocial support. For this reason, this is one of the aspects where the 
impact of the program should be most strongly noticed. Unfortunately, there is 
no way to clearly determine the validity of these results, since we do not count 
on pre-treatment statistics for these variables. In addition, they are only available 
for the year 2006. The variables shown are the addition of the positive answers 
at scales of 4 or 5 questions each. The scales have good metric properties, un-
derstood as Cronbach alpha coefficients of 0.7 or superior.
Manzi (2007) interprets the psychosocial results for the Chile Solidario 
Panel. The results shown on the table below are very positive, with the excep-
tions of the Social Network variables. Especially important are the results in 
Vision of Future and Expectations of Change, which have been consistent in 
all estimations made in the Chile Solidario Panel. These show a much more 
positive attitude when facing future challenges from the treatment group than 
from the controls. It can be appreciated that controls are less active when facing 
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TABLE 11
Psychosocial Variables (2006) Impact t Mean T Mean C N
Vision of Future 0.116 4.333 2.361 2.245 1729
Expectations of Change 0.138 5.540 1.992 1.854 1728
Family Network –0.101 –2.851 2.226 2.327 1730
Friends Network –0.111 –3.154 1.683 1.794 1729
Self-Control (internal) 0.136 4.587 3.601 3.465 1723
Self-Control (external) 0.057 1.265 2.920 2.863 1723
Efficacy on the Job 0.083 3.258 2.563 2.480 1723
Efficacy on the childs school 0.054 3.063 2.810 2.756 1700
Mental Health 0.006 0.275 3.075 3.070 1730
Self-image 0.121 3.540 4.265 4.144 1728
8.  A Possible Solution to the Data Issues: The Administrative 
Panel Database
As a potential solution for all the issues of the evaluation based on the 
Chile Solidario Panel, an evaluation based con administrative record was 
implemented.
An effort was made to gather different sources of administrative informa-
tion in order to generate a Panel database made of Administrative records to 
evaluate the impact of Chile Solidario. Through an individual’s Identification 
Number, available in each database, different records for the same individual 
were gathered. The CAS database, the Ficha de Protección Social (FPS) 
database and the Puente Database are the most important pieces of the 
Administrative Panel.
Each family’s CAS record information is yearly stored in databases. These 
databases count on the information of all the records completed by a family and 
that are still valid by December of the CAS database year in question. As an 
example, CAS database 2001 contains information of all families completing 
a CAS record between December 1999 and December 2001.
The Social Protection Record (FPS) replaced the CAS record in 2006. It is 
a different instrument, aiming to depict the potential families have to generate 
incomes. From November 2006 until April 2007 a massive poll was carried out 
at the national level that covered 1,375,041 homes (62.7% of the total polled 
homes) by May 1, 2007. (See Figure 5).
Thus, information from CAS records between the years 2000 and 2005 were 
put together and with them, the information from the Social Protection record 
and information from the Chile Solidario administrative records (Puente Bases). 
Some concerns about this database are assessed below.
Unit of Analysis: The CAS record considered the family as a reference unit, 
describing a family as the group of people living together and acknowledging 
themselves as a family group whether they have a kinship link between them 
or not, who have the intention of remaining together, and have some kind of 
monetary income. The definition of “family” for the FPS is similar to that of 
CAS, only that it specifically states that the group must share a common budget 
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Questions Comparability: FPS data are not necessarily equivalent to those of 
the CAS Record. In particular, some of the questions are different. An example 
of this is that the CAS record inquired about incomes in only one question, 
whereas FPS did so in many, trying to identify all possible sources of income. 
The below table presents comparisons between the value of a group of varia-
bles in CAS record 2005 and FPS 2006, so as to show the magnitude of the 
comparability problems.
Table 13 presents the number of observations (after having left only one 
observation per family) available on the panel used for the analysis. They are 
separated in Puente and No Puente depending on whether the family took part 
in Chile Solidario at some point or not.
Quality of the data and measurement error: As has been mentioned before, the 
data available is fundamentally used to target subsidies and access to public 
programs. Due to this reason, it could be expected that the data suffer from 
strong underreporting, for example, of incomes. On the other hand, the amount 
of handled data is so high that this type of systematic failure in the dependent 
variables should be less worrisome. The main variables used in the study (CAS 
and Program participation) are obtained from administrative sources, so they do 
not suffer from measurement errors. In general, the main estimations made for 
this paper are double differences, so any measurement error problem affecting 
the treatment group should affect the controls in a similar way, thus voiding 
each other. In the same way, if one of the groups has a different type of measu-
FIGURE 5
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rement error from the other, but the error is constant in time, that error will be 
eliminated in the differences analysis.
Attrition:On this panel, attrition can arise for reasons that are different from 
those arising in a normal panel poll (they did not want to participate in the 
CAS record completion process; they do not have a current valid ID, etc). If a 
family appears in a CAS database and that family is a Chile Solidario program 
beneficiary, it is highly probable that this fact has an influence on the likeli-
hood that they will appear in the next CAS database, contact with the council 
administration, minimum condition of having an ID, etc). This phenomenon 
must be studied, since if this is the case, it could bias the impact estimations of 
the program. Tests for attrition randomness have been carried out and it seem 
like there is a correlation between attrition and some observable characteristics, 
including some related to the participation in Chile Solidario23. It is not possible 
23  A first attrition randomness test is to measure whether some of the characteristics of the families 
(particularly participation in the program) determine the probability that the observation is 
being lost. In order to avoid the mechanical fulfilment of the relation between the program 
and the attrition (whoever entered the program in 2004 would have necessarily had to have 
a valid CAS record for that year), attrition is studied in years 2004 or 2005 explained by 
variables from the year 2002. The binomial variable indicating whether the family entered 
Chile Solidario during the first year of the program is significant and negative.
TABLE 12
COMPARABILITy BETWEEN CAS 2005 AND FPS
Comparability of Income Between CAS and FPS (2006 pesos)
Family Total CAS 2005 $ 120,124
Family Total FPS $ 157,239
Family Head CAS 2005 $ 86,673
Family Head FPS $ 108,219
# workers in the Hhld CAS 2005 0.94
#workers in the Hhld FPS 1.13
% of Hhld Head with job CAS 2005 0.62
% of Hhld Head with job FPS 0.60
TABLE 13
OBSERVATIONS IN EACH yEAR FOR CAS AND FPS
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to quantify the magnitude of this effect without specific work on the subject, 
which has not been mentioned in this study.
As a consequence of the previous situation, it is necessary to look for 
a way to control the attrition effects in this panel, which can become very 
important. Thus, it is necessary to choose a follow up unit that simplifies 
as much as possible the control of this phenomenon. The analysis units to 
be followed up in time are the families to which those head of the families 
reported in CAS 2002 (pre-treatment situation) belong. In this case, during 
the successive measurements, the anchor taken will be the head of the family 
and/or his or her spouse. The family or home can be the same over time, or 
it can be the case that its members have changed. Only the anchor cannot 
change. In particular, in bi-parental families the anchor will be the woman 
and in mono-parental families it will be the man or the woman that is the 
head of the family. This is because in most cases those appointed to receive 
the bonus are the people within the family, and given the case that the family 
composition changes, Chile Solidario payments remain with the owner of 
the bonus. As a consequence, choosing this unit would provide much more 
stability for the person to be followed in respect to his or her participation in 
the program. Additionally, this analysis unit is the one that most agrees with 
the administrative definitions of Chile Solidario.
9.  Treated and Control Groups
This evaluation covers those families that entered the program during the first 
18 months, separating them into corresponding cohorts of three months each. 
The following graphic presents the families’ admission pace into the program, as 
well as the groups that are going to be evaluated (delimited by vertical lines).
These groups were selected because they had spent enough time in the 
program by 2005. The division into six cohorts was the result of an interest in 
being able to isolate the effects of different levels of treatment. The controls are 
chosen, as in the Chile Solidario Panel, in such a way that their mean survey 
date is similar that of the treatment group. In the below table, we show the most 
important characteristics of selected groups. The second and the third columns 
are the months where the cohort entered the program. The fourth and fifth 
columns are the average date of the survey (CAS record) for the treatment and 
control groups. Because it was one of the selection criteria for the comparison 
group, the dates are very similar. The following two columns, which are closely 
related, are the total time of observation (the time between the first CAS record 
to the CAS record 2005, which is always the last observation used). The total 
time of observation is also very similar between the treatment and the control 
groups, something that wasn’t granted, given the nature of the database. The 
final column is the total time of treatment for the treatment cohort, which is 
between 2.4 and 1.4 years.
Another, more important decision that had to be made for the evaluation 
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who had been or would be participants of Chile Solidario, should be part of 
the control group. The problem is important given that, even though Chile 
Solidario participants represent a small fraction of the total panel sample 
(between 13% and 16%, see Table 13), they were closer in characteristics to 
the treatment group, thus having a higher probability of being chosen as part 
of the control group. Three alternatives were considered when estimating for 
each cohort:
1.  To leave all other past and future Chile Solidario participants into the sample, 
allowing them to be considered part of the control group. This method implied 
FIGURE 6
FAMILIES ADMISSION PACE TO CHILE SOLIDARIO












Cohort 1 jan-02 mar-02 apr-01 aug-01 3.4 3.1 2.4
Cohort 2 apr-02 jun-02 jul-01 sep-01 3.1 3.0 2.2
Cohort 3 jul-02 sep-02 nov-01 nov-01 2.8 2.9 2.0
Cohort 4 oct-02 dec-02 jan-02 dec-01 2.7 2.8 1.8
Cohort 5 jan-02 mar-03 apr-02 feb-02 2.5 2.6 1.6
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an important underestimation of the impacts of the program, as there were an 
important proportion of families on the control group (after matching) that 
participated in the program during the evaluation period. The table below 
shows, for each cohort, the percentage of the controls (after having been 
chosen by matching and weighted for their participation using the nearest 
neighbor estimation) that participated in Chile Solidario at any time during 
the period of this evaluation. It also shows the mean time of treatment for 
the treatment group on each cohort (naturally, decreasing with the cohort); 
the mean time of treatment for all controls; and the time of treatment for the 
controls that were part of Chile Solidario. It can be seen that, on average, a 
control group family had around a third of the mean time of intervention of 
a treated family. The Chile Solidario families on the control group, however, 










Cohort 1 39% 878 226 587
Cohort 2 37% 816 207 559
Cohort 3 38% 738 224 586
Cohort 4 39% 653 226 586
Cohort 5 37% 577 222 597
Cohort 6 37% 494 220 592
2.  To take all other past and future Chile Solidario participants out of the 
sample, thus denying the possibility for them to be included in the control 
group. This alternative seemed the most obvious. However, if this were 
done, we would have strongly biased the control group. The matching occurs 
before the treatment. However, for the next cohorts, their entrance into the 
program occurs after the matching, and is likely not to happen randomly. 
Chile Solidario is targeted to the poorest people. It is probable that the worst-
performing controls after the matching will end up entering the program, so 
we would have underestimated the impact of the program by introducing 
ex-post selection bias on the control group. There is no way to correct this 
problem, after people have been taken out of the sample.
3.  The standard correction for substitution and dropout bias when the treatment 
status is binary is widely known, as explained in Heckman, LaLonde and 
Smith (1999) or in Heckman et al. (2000). It suggests carrying out the usual 
estimation of the parameter, as the average of all the treatment group (in-
cluding individuals dropping out) less the average of all the control group 
(including individuals taking substitute training), but then scaling up the 
result for the inverse of the difference in probability of participation. This 
is the same correction that is generally used in instrumental variables or in 
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  However, in Chile Solidario the treatment is not binary; in any given date 
there are very different periods of exposure to the program across the bene-
ficiaries. The correction we propose (and the estimation method we finally 
chose) is a very simple extension to that technique:












  Where ϕ is the impact of the program, YT – Yc is the usual estimator for mat-
ching, once the control and treatment groups have been selected. TT is the 
average treatment time in the treated group and Tc is the average treatment 
time in the control group. In practice, the estimator rescales the estimated 
impact, accounting for the fact that the difference between the means of the 
groups is due to just a subgroup, that are the families whose matches are not 
participating on the program. This way, we don’t have to introduce selection 
bias and we are able to estimate even while having different individuals in the 
control group both participating and not participating on the program24. The 
necessary assumptions for this estimator, besides the standard assumptions 
for matching, are that the potential outcomes of the group taking substitute 
training are equal to the outcomes for the treatment group. The condition is 
trivially accomplished here, as the program they are taking is the same.
The decisions taken in this section are implemented in the results section, 
where the estimated impacts of the program are presented.
10. Results Using the Administrative Panel Database
In this section, the results are presented in two ways, graphically and grouped 
in tables. The same cohorts explained before are used as treatment groups.
On one hand, they are all represented in graphs by series, all referring to 
the variable that gives name to the graph. The x-axis has the different measure-
ments across the time, from the CAS record of 2000 to the FPS 2006. All the 
graphs show on the y-axis the impacts for each year –that is, the differences 
between treatment and control families- from the pretreatment years, where it 
is interesting to check the quality of the matching, to the later years, where the 
impacts of the program should be found. The cohorts are named by the family’s 
month of entry into the program.
24  The analytic distribution in not known for this estimator, and it is not clear if bootstrap is 
a valid method when using matching, so we rely on the same standard errors as before, 
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On the other hand, the exact numeric results are shown in tables, in particu-
lar, two results are shown: the pre-treatment differences-in-differences and the 
post-treatment differences-in-differences. The first is presented as a check that 
the matching is good enough on that variable, the latter, to estimate the effects 
of the program. To ensure objectivity, the following sequence is followed in the 
commentaries: If there are negative and significant effects pre-treatment, the 
result is only highlighted if it’s positive and significant. If there are positive and 
significant effects pre-treatment, the result is only highlighted if it’s negative and 
significant. Finally, if there aren’t pre-treatment effects, the result is highlighted 
whenever it’s significant.
A total of eight variables are analyzed: CAS score, three labor income variables 
(income of the head of family, income per capita and total family income), three 
employment variables (employment of the head of family, number of workers 
in the family and percent of workers in the family) and number of people in the 
family, which is analyzed because most other results depend on this variable.
The tables show the estimated impact and the t-test (both already multiplied 
by the scaling factor), the factor itself, the mean of the 2005-2002 difference 
for the treated group, and the same mean for the control group. The number 
of treated families and the (non-weighted) number of control families are also 
reported.
10.1. Labor income of the head of the family
TABLE 16
Family Head Labor Income Impact t Factor Mean T Mean C NC NT
Jan-Mar 2002 DD_PreTreatment $  1,602 1.72 1.35 –$  4,504 –$  5,687 10573 3012
DD $  2,385 1.92 1.35 $  5,592 $  3,831 10573 3012
Apr-Jul 2002 DD_PreTreatment –$  1,551 –1.99 1.35 –$  6,624 –$  5,475 16070 4904
DD –$  384 –0.46 1.35 $  3,421 $  3,705 16070 4904
Jul-Sep 2002 DD_PreTreatment –$  1,670 –1.33 1.44 –$  7,498 –$  6,338 9983 2756
DD $  3,385 2.95 1.44 $  5,916 $  3,565 9983 2756
Oct-Dec 2002 DD_PreTreatment –$  4,671 –3.19 1.53 –$  8,344 –$  5,290 9486 2587
DD $  3,053 2.92 1.53 $  4,746 $  2,750 9486 2587
Jan-Mar 2003 DD_PreTreatment –$  1,204 –1.10 1.64 –$  6,249 –$  5,515 11109 3058
DD –$  2,724 –2.60 1.64 $  1,336 $  2,998 11109 3058
Apr-Jun 2003 DD_PreTreatment $  2,077 2.09 1.86 –$  5,301 –$  6,420 12331 3442
DD –$  3,962 –3.99 1.86 $  691 $  2,825 12331 3442
There is a pattern in the results; we obtain negative results for the two 
less-treated cohorts, while obtaining positive results for the previous two. The 
multiplying factor has a key role here, permitting two of the results to become 
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FIGURE 7
LABOR INCOME OF THE HEAD OF THE FAMILy
10.2. Total family labor income
TABLE 17
Total Family Labor Income Impact t Factor Mean T Mean C NC NT
Jan-Mar 2002 DD_PreTreatment $  79 0.06 1.35 –$  5,371 –$  5,430 9661 2726
DD $ 10,502 5.84 1.35 –$ 17,064 $  9,278 9661 2726
Apr-Jul 2002 DD_PreTreatment –$  4,710 –4.40 1.34 –$  8,828 –$  5,316 15230 4659
DD $  665 0.60 1.34 –$ 10,058 $  9,562 15230 4659
Jul-Sep 2002 DD_PreTreatment –$  8,225 –4.89 1.43 –$ 12,422 –$  6,688 9296 2571
DD $  4,102 2.77 1.43 –$ 13,104 $ 10,245 9296 2571
Oct-Dec 2002 DD_PreTreatment –$ 10,818 –5.99 1.52 –$ 11,771 –$  4,671 9008 2456
DD $  5,195 3.78 1.52 $11,270 $  7,860 9008 2456
Jan-Mar 2003 DD_PreTreatment –$  4,348 –2.97 1.64 –$  9,039 –$  6,384 10501 2890
DD –$  1,040 –0.77 1.64 –$  8,254 $  8,889 10501 2890
Apr-Jun 2003 DD_PreTreatment –$  4,033 –3.03 1.86 –$  8,277 –$  6,112 11769 3297
DD $  397 0.30 1.86 $    8,639 $  8,426 11769 3297
Three positive results are found, which is remarkable given the negative 
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FIGURE 8
TOTAL FAMILy LABOR INCOME
10.3. Per capita labor income
TABLE 18
Per Capita Labor Income Impact t Factor Mean T Mean C NC NT
Jan-Mar 2002 DD_PreTreatment –$  36 –0.12 1.35 –$  700 –$  674 9662 2726
DD $  597 1.37 1.35 $ 6,124 $ 5,681 9662 2726
Apr-Jul 2002 DD_PreTreatment –$  183 –0.77 1.34 –$  810 –$  673 15232 4661
DD –$  522 –1.43 1.34 $ 4,913 $ 5,303 15232 4661
Jul-Sep 2002 DD_PreTreatment –$ 1,146 –2.92 1.43 –$ 1,482 –$  684 9296 2571
DD $  327 0.82 1.43 $ 5,340 $ 5,112 9296 2571
Oct-Dec 2002 DD_PreTreatment –$ 1,602 –3.78 1.52 –$ 1,353 –$  302 9008 2456
DD –$  208 –0.57 1.52 $ 4,517 $ 4,653 9008 2456
Jan-Mar 2003 DD_PreTreatment $  275 0.81 1.64 –$  511 –$  680 10501 2890
DD –$ 2,314 –6.52 1.64 $ 3,662 $ 5,075 10501 2890
Apr-Jun 2003 DD_PreTreatment $  819 2.82 1.86 –$  169 –$  608 11769 3297
DD –$ 1,923 –5.78 1.86 $ 3,823 $ 4,856 11769 3297
The two results found keep the pattern seen in the first graph: the less-
treated cohorts received the worst results. Again, negative results are observed 
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FIGURE 9
PER CAPITA LABOR INCOME
10.4. Percentage of workers in the family
TABLE 19
% of Workers in the Family Impact t Factor Mean T Mean C NC NT
Jan-Mar 2002 DD_PreTreatment –0.008 –2.49 1.35 –0.015 –0.009 11753 3333
DD 0.010 2.36 1.35 0.025 0.018 11753 3333
Apr-Ju1 2002 DD_PreTreatment –0.011 –3.94 1.34 –0.015 –0.007 18000 5492
DD 0.006 2.05 1.34 0.016 0.011 18000 5492
Jul-Sep 2002 DD_PreTreatment –0.021 –5.73 1.43 –0.017 –0.002 10948 3017
DD 0.019 4.63 1.43 0.019 0.006 10948 3017
Oct-Dec 2002 DD_PreTreatment –0.005 –1.16 1.53 –0.010 –0.007 10455 2843
DD 0.006 1.40 1.53 0.014 0.011 10455 2843
Jan-Mar 2003 DD_PreTreatment –0.004 –1.15 1.63 –0.011 –0.008 12326 3406
DD 0.011 3.07 1.63 0.011 0.004 12326 3406
Apr-Jun 2003 DD_PreTreatment 0.000 0.06 1.80 –0.008 –0.008 13897 3876
DD 0.012 3.39 1.80 0.012 0.005 13897 3876
Five of the six possible results are positive and significant, which is very 
impressive. Although the results are not large in magnitude, since there are a 
large number of observations, it is statistically possible to capture effects of 
that size. It is worth remarking that the mean values of the variables are not 
high, so the impact attributable to the program represents an important part of 
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FIGURE 10
PERCENTAGE OF WORKERS IN THE FAMILy
10.5. Number of workers in the family
TABLE 20
Number of Workers in the Family Impact t Factor Mean T Mean C NC NT
Jan-Mar 2002 DD_PreTreatment –0.043 –3.63 1.35 – 0.047 – 0.016 11753 3333
DD 0.113 7.89 1.35 0.077 – 0.007 11753 3333
Apr-Jul 2002 DD_PreTreatment –0.063 –6.20 1.34 – 0.060 – 0.013 18000 5492
DD 0.087 7.79 1.34 0.040 – 0.025 18000 5492
Jul-Sep 2002 DD_PreTreatment –0.085 –6.09 1.43 – 0.074 – 0.014 10948 3017
DD 0.097 6.78 1.43 0.055 – 0.013 10948 3017
Oct-Dec 2002 DD_PreTreatment –0.060 –4.09 1.53 – 0.064 – 0.024 10455 2843
DD 0.094 6.41 1.53 0.053 – 0.008 10455 2843
Jan-Mar 2003 DD_PreTreatment –0.058 –4.25 1.63 – 0.057 – 0.021 12326 3406
DD 0.096 7.26 1.63 0.028 – 0.031 12326 3406
Apr-Jun 2003 DD_PreTreatment –0.064 –5.17 1.80 – 0.056 – 0.020 13897 3876
DD 0.095 7.79 1.80 0.030 – 0.023 13897 3876
This presents the most important evidence as to the effects of the program. 
Not only are all the results positive, but also all had pre-treatment negative effects. 
The evidence is very strong in this case, and consistent with the women-oriented 
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FIGURE 11
NUMBER OF WORKERS IN THE FAMILy
10.6. CAS score
TABLE 21
CAS Score Impact t Factor Mean T Mean C NC NT
Jan-Mar2002 DD_PreTreatment 1.558 2.91 1.35 – 7.092 – 8.249 11753 3333
DD 7.795 11.37 1.35 28.542 22.753 11753 3333
Apr-Jul2002 DD_PreTreatment 0.159 0.35 1.34 – 8.365 – 8.484 18000 5492
DD 2.908 5.49 1.34 25.300 23.130 18000 5492
Jul-Sep2002 DD_PreTreatment –2.571 –4.26 1.43 – 9.428 – 7.636 10948 3017
DD 1.845 2.76 1.43 23.008 21.722 10948 3017
Oct-Dec2002 DD_PreTreatment 0.519 0.84 1.53 – 7.808 – 8.147 10455 2843
DD –0.599 –0.93 1.53 20.051 20.443 10455 2843
Jan-Mar2003 DD_PreTreatment –2.640 –4.47 1.63 – 8.962 – 7.338 12326 3406
DD –1.991 –3.26 1.63 18.817 20.042 12326 3406
Apr-Jun2003 DD_PreTreatment –0.880 –1.64 1.80 – 8.445 – 7.956 13897 3876
DD –2.992 –5.33 1.80 17.309 18.970 13897 3876
A reiterative pattern is present here, with the cohorts around the middle 
obtaining the most positive impacts and the less-treated cohorts the worst. 
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FIGURE 12
CAS SCORE
10.7. Employment of the head of the family
TABLE 22
Employment of the Family Head Impact t Factor Mean T Mean C NC NT
Jan-Mar 2002 DD_PreTreatment –0.006 –0.79 1.35 – 0.020 – 0.015 11753 3333
DD 0.019 2.20 1.35 – 0.020 – 0.034 11753 3333
Apr-Jul 2002 DD_PreTreatment 0.000 0.02 1.34 – 0.009 – 0.010 18000 5492
DD 0.019 2.83 1.34 – 0.028 – 0.042 18000 5492
Jul-Sep 2002 DD_PreTreatment 0.005 0.53 1.43 0.004 0.001 10948 3017
DD 0.029 3.50 1.43 – 0.031 – 0.052 10948 3017
Oct-Dec 2002 DD_PreTreatment –0.009 –1.04 1.53 – 0.013 – 0.007 10455 2843
DD 0.020 2.29 1.53 – 0.027 – 0.040 10455 2843
Jan-Mar 2003 DD_PreTreatment 0.018 2.30 1.63 – 0.004 – 0.015 12326 3406
DD 0.011 1.33 1.63 – 0.039 – 0.046 12326 3406
Apr-Jun 2003 DDPreTreatment 0.017 2.18 1.80 – 0.010 – 0.019 13897 3876
DD 0.036 4.94 1.80 – 0.017 – 0.038 13897 3876
Again, there is a clear, positive pattern on the employment of the head of the 
family. The magnitudes are all around 2%, which is not huge, but this variable 
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FIGURE 13
EMPLOyMENT OF THE HEAD OF THE FAMILy
10.8. Number of people in the family
TABLE 23
Number of People in the Family Impact t Factor mean T mean C NC NT
Jan-Mar 2002 DD_PreTreatment –0.022 –0.92 1.35 0.022 0.038 11753 3333
DD 0.368 13.31 1.35 – 0.089 – 0.362 11753 3333
Apr-Jul 2002 DD_PreTreatment –0.106 –4.98 1.34 – 0.053 0.026 18000 5492
DD 0.266 11.90 1.34 – 0.127 – 0.325 18000 5492
Jul-Sep 2002 DD_PreTreatment –0.087 –2.92 1.43 – 0.086 – 0.025 10948 3017
DD 0.215 7.88 1.43 – 0.083 – 0.232 10948 3017
Oct-Dec 2002 DD_PreTreatment –0.170 –5.34 1.53 – 0.125 – 0.013 10455 2843
DD 0.241 8.87 1.53 – 0.083 – 0.240 10455 2843
Jan-Mar 2003 DD_PreTreatment –0.153 –5.41 1.63 – 0.098 – 0.004 12326 3406
DD 0.219 8.79 1.63 – 0.106 – 0.241 12326 3406
Apr-Jun 2003 DD_PreTreatment –0.207 –7.54 1.80 – 0.114 0.001 13897 3876
DD 0.281 12.22 1.80 – 0.092 – 0.248 13897 3876
This is the clearest pattern of all, and the reason for this phenomenon is not 
clear. Possible hypotheses include people moving in with their close families 
or friends, to get the benefits of the program. Given these results, it is neces-
sary to be very careful with the interpretation of the previous results, especially 
with the total labor income of the family or the number of workers, which will 
tend to be overestimated- and with the per capita variables, which will tend to 
be underestimated.Estudios de Economía, Vol. 38 - Nº 1 166
FIGURE 14
NUMBER OF PEOPLE IN THE FAMILy
11. Conclusions
The Impact Evaluation of Chile Solidario is a pioneer initiative in Chile to 
perform a follow-up over time of the families that benefitted and families that 
did not benefit from the system. The lessons learned in this process of more 
than four years of investigation provide knowledge that is unique in Chile about 
the design and evaluation of future public policies. In spite of this, there are 
a number of serious problems coming from a careful analysis of the data that 
cause the results to be less reliable than might be deemed necessary for making 
future policy decisions. One problem was that the Chile Solidario Panel sample 
did not have an adequate sample selection, nor was it transparent enough, which 
is evident in the difficulty in creating an adequate control group. In addition, 
the unit to be followed through time was never formally established. The at-
trition rate up to 2004 was not documented and no measures to reduce it had 
been taken. Through all the rounds there were serious problems in obtaining 
beneficiary IDs. With respect to the original sample design, serious mistakes 
were made when choosing the controls. Finally, and most importantly, it was 
not possible to count with a baseline.
In this work, an analysis of the feasibility of carrying out an impact evalua-
tion for the Chile Solidario program was made. The process by which slots by 
district are assigned and the mechanism by which families are taking the slots 
in the program has been fully described. Both aspects are essential to achiev-
ing a valid identification strategy. The group of variables that appear to have 
an influence in the participation in the system have been described, and the 
possibility of carrying out an impact evaluation by Matching was discussed. 
Using this group of variables in the propensity score, the quality of the match-
ing was tested on pre-treatment variables. The Chile Solidario Panel was put 
to the test, estimating the impacts on a group of variables for which there is 
pre-treatment information. The results are not very encouraging, since there 
are many variables showing pre-treatment differences between the treatment 
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that did not use administrative variables had strong pre-treatment differences 
between the treatment group and the control group before the first participants 
entered the program. As a result of these problems, the results obtained in this 
evaluation should be qualified as not conclusive.
From a total of 10 related variables related to employment and income –the 
only ones allowing a comparison with pre-treatment CAS variables– four are not 
possible to estimate, because of large pre-treatment differences. The results for 
the income variables are not very illustrative, since the variable for the number 
of people in the family is unbalanced. The variables for the number of employed 
people in the family, the number of working women, and the percentage of work-
ing women have negative or zero impact using the differences-in-differences 
approach. Head of the family employment has, instead, positive differences-
in-differences results.
Among variables without baseline, in terms of indigence and poverty we 
observed strongly negative impacts in the cross-sectional analysis. However, 
the impact when using differences-in-differences is zero; it is highly probable 
that this is due to differences in the pre-treatment situation of the groups. In the 
psychosocial area and recruitment to public offerings there is an important group 
of variables for which cross-sectional impacts are found, but these same impacts 
are not found in differences-in-differences. It is likely that these impacts are 
real, but in a strict sense there is no way to distinguish if the groups had these 
differences prior to the process or if they are the result of the program. Inside 
this group are the expectations of change, employment registration and vision 
of future variables, for example. Finally, take-up of post-natal care and dental 
examinations do have differences-in-differences impacts.
In order to solve the main problems of the Chile Solidario Panel, an 
Administrative Panel Database was generated, using over 800,000 registries 
per year, across seven years. This database had, however, some problems, 
such as selective attrition and measurement error. One of the most important 
problems was the big proportion of families on the control group enrolling in 
Chile Solidario. A simple extension of the standard correction for substitution 
programs was adopted, and the impacts were estimated.
There are a number of positive significant effects, which are especially 
robust on the employment variables. Even though the magnitudes are not huge, 
achieving impacts on important variables such as employment of the head of 
the family may make substantial changes in the quality of life for those fami-
lies. These results are much more robust than those obtained from the Chile 
Solidario Panel.
The overall lesson of this evaluation for future social programs is clear: 
evaluation and management of the program should go hand in hand from the 
moment the program is being designed. In this sense, generalizing the usage of 
independent evaluations and professionally evaluated pilot programs is highly 
recommended. This may be the only way to rectify in forthcoming evaluations 
most of the difficulties faced by the evaluation of the Chile Solidario program. 
All large-scale public programs should follow this trend, improving every time 
the way in which the evaluations are planned and organized.Estudios de Economía, Vol. 38 - Nº 1 168
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